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DISASTER RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT OF  BUILDING AND TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM 
G.P. Cimellaro1, V. Arcidiacono2, A.M. Reinhorn3 
ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a new methodology to assist decision-makers in the management of critical 
events such as earthquakes evaluating the recovery time, and the resilience index of a building 
system that is a component of the physical infrastructure dimension of the PEOPLES Resilience 
framework. The interdependencies between building system and transportation network in term of 
accessibility is modelled. Finally, the methodology has been implemented in a software and has 
been applied in two case studies: a) the old medieval centre of L’Aquila town and b) the Treasure 
Island in the San Francisco Bay area.   
 
 
Keywords: Community resilience, disaster resilience, infrastructure interdependency, PEOPLES 
framework, restoration process, recovery, loss estimation, seismic hazard. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The tendency to globalize services, the ever-growing population, and the trend to push social, 
economic, technological, and biological systems to their limits are all likely to increase the 
frequency of large-scale disasters [Allan, 2013]. For example, electrical power outages 
(“blackouts”) have affected larger and larger areas. This is because of the growing and considerably 
varying demand of electricity (e.g. due to a greater number of air conditioners), the greater size and 
complexity of electrical power networks (often with a power exchange across countries), and the 
de-regulation of the power market (which encourages profits with minimum investments). 
Interconnected causality chains, i.e. a damage in a sector of a system affects the other systems, can 
describe the spreading of natural and man-made disasters. It is often these cascade effects (i.e. 
chain-reactions) by which a localized event in time and space causes a large-scale disaster, which 
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may affect the whole community [Helbing et al., 2006]. Therefore, redundancies are required to 
stop the chain-reactions, and for adapting to the changes of the economical and environmental 
conditions. For example, the earthquake in Kobe (Japan, 1995), was very destructive for both the 
towns and the highways. The main problems were the several fires, which were caused by broken 
gas pipes in wooden houses between skyscrapers. A great chaos was caused by the fact that the fire 
fighters could not reach the fires, because of the damage to the critical infrastructures (lifelines) 
such as the road network and to the water distribution network with many broken and/or 
dysfunctional water pipes. Thousands of people were homeless and panicked during the 
aftershocks. In addition, the power supply lines, hanging over the remaining streets, obstructed 
seriously the traffic, the transportation and the power supply. Hence, awareness of both manmade 
and natural disasters has increased in recent years and the concept of resilience has gained attention, 
because small damages can become catastrophes when the communities have no access to the 
emergency services [Arcidiacono and Cimellaro, 2013; Cimellaro et al., 2013; Scura et al., 2013].  
Therefore, the paper is focusing on the vulnerability of the transportation system and its use in 
emergencies using a methodology – which is based on the PEOPLES framework [Renschler et al., 
2010, Cimellaro et al., 2016] – that is able to assess the resilience index of the physical 
infrastructure dimension during an extreme event.  In detail, the paper focuses on the Building 
System [Arcidiacono et al., 2011] and its interdependencies with the Transportation System 
[Arcidiacono et al., 2012a; 2012b]. In particular it models functionality and resilience of this type of 
infrastructure.   
 
2 STATE-OF-ART OF CURRENT METHODOLOGIES 
The definition of Resilience adopted in this paper is “the ability of social units (e.g. organizations, 
communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters, plan and enact an effective 
strategy to recover its activities so as to minimize social disruption” [Bruneau et al., 2003; 2007]. 
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Moreover, the methodology was implemented in a software [Arcidiacono et al., 2011; 2012a; 
2012b; Cimellaro et al., 2013], which is able to assist decision-makers to prevent and minimize the 
disasters effect. 
Several methods are available in literature for loss estimation methodologies. Among them, the 
most famous is the HAZUS (abbreviation for Hazards United States) framework [Whitman et al., 
1997; FEMA, 2003; 2005] which was developed by the National Institute of Building Sciences 
(NIBS) and used by FEMA in 1997 to assess separately earthquake, wind, and flood losses within 
the USA. The method works on an inventory of various components such as population, buildings, 
transportation systems, lifeline utilities, and hazardous materials. It evaluates the status of a 
community – according to the direct and indirect losses due to social, economic, and physical 
aspects – with a multi-risk analysis approach. The losses are provided in probabilistic terms 
evaluating causalities, shelters, inundations, fires, debris, hazardous material releases, damage states 
of physical infrastructures, and economic losses.  Buildings are grouped in building classes with 
similar characteristics making a building inventory.  There are 36 different structural classes that 
depend on the construction type, the material, and the structural type, while the occupancy 
inventory of the general building stock in the HAZUS methodology is prepared based on its general 
and specific building occupancy. The building and occupancy type inventory are used, respectively, 
for the building risk assessment and to evaluate the potential economic losses. HAZUS 
methodology considers all hazards, but not all the interdependences between the structural 
components. For example, the damage of the transportation network inducted by the building debris 
is not modelled. Therefore, the methodology is “limited” to the risk assessment – not considering 
the functionality and the recovery plan – making it a useful tool to prevent damages and to design 
urban cities, but not to manage the communities during the catastrophic events. 
More recently, the ResilUS framework [Miles and Chang, 2006; 2007; 2011], based on the 
resilience concept, has been developed. It is limited to buildings and lifelines (transportation 
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network, electrical network, water supply, and critical facilities) and uses a macro-sub division of 
area contained within a broader community such as the neighbourhood subdivision, and subdivides 
the community in three elements that are: the physical built environment, economics, and humans 
(i.e., health). The method relies on two generic indicators of resilience: (i) the ability to perform and 
(ii) the opportunity to perform. These recovery indicators are specifically represented by multiple 
variables. For example, the indicator of the ability to perform for households is represented by the 
household health, while the reconstruction time is influenced by the size (single-family vs. multi-
family) of the respective building in addition to the construction capacity in the community 
(opportunity to perform). The model has four recovery curves, but currently the software ResilUS 
uses only one curve, that brings back to the pre-disaster conditions. The framework, therefore, 
facilitates the creation of a database for infrastructures and defines multiple resilience indicators 
making the optimal solution difficult to find, but different functionality models already available in 
the literature can be adopted. 
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology proposed in this paper is based on the PEOPLES Resilience framework 
[Cimellaro et al., 2016, Renschler et al., 2010]. In the method community resilience is evaluated 
combining seven dimensions – that are subdivided in components and sub-components – identified 
with the acronym P.E.O.P.L.E.S. (Population and demographics, Environmental/Ecosystem, 
Organized governmental services, Physical infrastructures, Lifestyle and community competence, 
Economic development, and Social-cultural capital). The Resilience can be considered as a 
dynamic quantity that changes over time and across space. This is analytically defined as the 
normalized shaded area underneath the functionality performance function Q(t) of a generic system:  
 R
r, tOE,TLC( ) = QTOT
r, t( )
TLCtOE
tOE+TLC
ò ×dt  (1) 
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where TLC is the control time of the period of interest; t0E is the time instant when the event 
happens;  
r  is a vector defining the position within the selected region where the resilience index is 
evaluated [Cimellaro et al., 2010a], and ( ),TOTQ r t  is the global functionality of the region 
considered that is evaluated combining the performance indicators of each dimension of the 
resilience framework and is defined as follows [Reinhorn and Cimellaro, 2011] 
 QTOT
r, t( ) = QTOT QP,QEnv,QO,QPh,QL,QEco,QS( )  (2) 
where Qx are the functionalities of the seven dimensions of the PEOPLES framework [Cimellaro et 
al., 2016]. The proposed methodology uses as key indicators the recovery time TEW, the global 
functionality QTOT(t), the resilience indicator R( 
r ,tOE,TLC) associated to each dimension and the 
community resilience index RI. The latter is defined as the resilience value R at the end of the 
recovery works TEW (i.e. when the functionality reaches the expected value that can be greater or 
less than 100%) starting from the disaster time tOE (i.e. when the disaster occurred). 
 ( ) ( ), ,O EWERI r R tr T=   (3) 
 
Once the community resilience index is defined, different scenarios of restoration plans can be 
considered, while the scenario that maximizes the Resilience index R and minimizes the recovery 
time, TEW is selected.  
 
4 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DIMENSION 
The term infrastructure has been used in English since 1887 and in French since at least 1875, 
originally meaning “The installations that form the basis for any operation or system” [Lewis, 
2008].  The word is a combination of the latin word “infra”, meaning “below”, and “structure”.  It 
can be defined as “the physical components of interrelated systems providing commodities and 
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services essential to enable, sustain, or enhance societal living conditions” [Fulmer, 2009]. The 
literature is characterized by the lack of an accepted description for infrastructure.  The definition of 
infrastructure adopted in this paper includes highways, streets, roads, and bridges; mass transit; 
airports and airways; water supply and water resources; wastewater management; solid waste 
treatment and disposal; electric power generation and transmission; telecommunications; and 
hazardous waste management – and the combined system these modal elements comprise. However 
in the definition of infrastructure are also included the operating procedures, management practices 
and development policies that interact together with societal demand and the physical world.   
The physical infrastructures correspond to a subcategory of infrastructures and refer to the basic 
physical structures required for an economy to function and survive, such as transportation 
networks, a power grid and sewerage and waste disposal systems.   
The methodology proposed in this paper describes how to evaluate the functionality of the Physical 
Infrastructure dimension according to the PEOPLES framework, dividing it in 5 levels 
(Dimensions, Systems, Categories, Sub-categories, and Boundary levels) (Figure 1).  The seven 
dimensions of the PEOPLES framework are included at the Dimension level in Figure 1 and 
because in the paper we are focusing on the Physical Infrastructure dimension, the latter is 
emphasized with respect to the other dimensions.  Furthermore, the functionality of the Physical 
Infrastructure dimension QPh(t) is analytically defined as  
 ( )
( ), ,
,
Ph Ph
s i s i
i
Ph Ph
s i
i
w Q t
Q t
w
×
=

  (4) 
 where Qs,iPh(t) and ws,iPh correspond to the functionalities and the weight coefficients associated to 
the i-th system respectively.  At the System level, for the same reason above, it is made distinction 
between “building system”, described in more detail in paragraph 4 and “other systems”.  The 
Categories level evaluates the redundancy ratio of certain categories of elements that create a 
system, while the Sub-categories level calculates the functionality of each element of the 
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infrastructure, evaluating dependencies and interdependencies between dimensions, systems, 
category, and sub-category. Finally, the Boundary level evaluates the damages and the recovery 
plan of the physical infrastructure units.   
Boundary
Sub-categories
Categories
Systems
Dimensions
Physical Infrastructures
Buildings System
Building Categories
Building Unit Typologies
Recovery Plan Risk Assessment
Other Systems:
Other Categories:
Other Sub-categories:
Other Dimensions:
Qd t( ) Rd tOE ,TLC( ) RId
d = P, Env, O, L, Eco, S
QPh t( ) RPh tOE ,TLC( ) RIPh
QB
Ph t( ) RBPh tOE ,TLC( ) RIBPh
Qs
Ph t( ) RsPh tOE,TLC( ) RIsPh
s = Transportation,  Water,  etc.
Qh
Ph,B t( ) RhPh,B tOE ,TLC( ) RIhPh,B
h = R,  M ,  C,  N,  E,  F,  H ,  U,  T .
Qh
Ph,s t( ) RhPh,s tOE ,TLC( ) RIhPh,s
h = Road  Network,  Power  Grid,  etc.
Qt
Ph,B,h t( ) RtPh,B,h tOE ,TLC( ) RItPh,B,h
t = Housing Unit, Hospital, etc.
Qt
Ph,s ,h t( ) RtPh,s,h tOE ,TLC( ) RItPh,s,h
t = Bridge,Road, Pipe, etc.
Community
 
Figure 1. Flowchart for evaluating the Building System functionality and resilience according to 
the PEOPLES framework [Cimellaro et al., 2016]. 
 
5 BUILDINGS SYSTEM 
The Buildings System is defined as a group of building units interconnected each other, which use 
and supply services from/to the community for any activity. The term building unit, i.e. 
construction, refers to “a relatively permanent enclosed construction over a plot of land, having a 
roof and usually windows and often more than one level, used for any of a wide variety of activities, 
as living, entertaining, or manufacturing” [dictionary.com, 2013]. While, the building services are 
“the utilities, including electricity, gas, steam, telephone, and water, supplied to and used within a 
building” [AAMI, 2013].  
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The proposed methodology identifies redundancies of building typologies and interdependences 
between and among building units and utilities, i.e. lifeline systems, as key factors, i.e. 
performances, of the buildings system. It means that the functionality of the building unit is related 
among all of dimensions, systems, categories, and sub-categories (Figure 1). 
 
5.1 Redundancy 
Redundancy is an attribute of resilience and it represents the duplication of available resources in a 
system with the intention of increasing its reliability.  For example, the functionality of the building 
category – i.e. a class or group of building units that have some qualities in common, e.g. 
residential housing units, health care facilities, etc. – depends on its redundancy or in other words 
the number of units with similar characteristics.  If we focus on health care facilities, a single 
hospital is less resilient with respect to an hospital network during an emergency, because the 
redundancy of this specific building category in a network is higher.   
The proposed methodology has identified nine classes or categories within the Building system that 
have common features (Table 1). Then each category is divided in sub-categories that identify a 
typology of the building unit.  
Table 1. Building System: Categories and Typologies. 
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Hence, the functionality of the Building System QBPh(t) is the weight average of the functionalities 
of the Building Categories QhPh,B(t) that are the weight averages of the functionalities of the 
Building Unit Typologies QtPh,B,h(t).  Analytically their expressions are the following 
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 where h and whPh,B, tandwtPh,B,h , u and wuPh,B,h,t are the indices and the weight coefficients of the 
building category, the building sub-categories and the building units respectively; QtuPh,B,h(t) is the 
functionality of the Building Unit that is defined in the next paragraph in Equation (6).   Suggested 
values of the weight indices are provided in Table 1 and they have been determined based on 
engineering judgment that has an important role in safety assessment.  
5.2 Interdependency 
The performances of the Buildings System cannot be determined without considering the 
interdependencies that in this approach have been taken into account at the Building Unit level. In 
fact, the performances of a generic Building Unit QtuPh,B,h(t) mainly depend on its structural qS,u(t) 
and non-structural qNS,uPh,B,h,t(t) functionalities. The structural functionality is defined as the 
percentage of building unit that is usable and its estimation will be discussed in the following 
section. Instead, the non-structural functionality depends on the building typology and on its 
interdependencies with utilities and on the performances of the services supplied from the building. 
In particular, the non-structural performances can be measured observing: 
 the quality of services received such as water, electricity, natural gas, oil, heating, internet, 
etc.;  
 the quality of services supplied that depends on the building unit typology, e.g. hospitals 
provide health care, police and fire stations provide assistance to citizens, power plants 
provide electrical power, etc.; 
11 
 
Hence, the definition of functionality of a Building Unit is provided by the following equation 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
, , , ,
, ,, ,
, , , , , , ,
, , ,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
0
;
with: 1 1
Ph B h Ph B h
u uPh B h
u Ph B h Ph B h Ph B h
u u u
Ph B h Ph B h Ph B h
u S u NS u NS u
q t U
Q t
q t q t U
q t q t w q t
t t
t
t t t
t t
t
 =  
 = ×  ×  
 (6) 
where UtuPh,B,h are the lower bound limits that define the usability of the building units, and 
wNS,uPh,B,h,t are the weight coefficients that define the importance of the non-structural functionality 
with respect to the structural functionality. Suggested values are given in Table 1. The Usability 
defines the limit between people coming back to their houses and people waiting in provisional 
shelters or in temporary houses. 
Thus, in the methodology, nine key factors have been identified for evaluating the non-structural 
performances of a building unit (Table 2). These values will be analytically defined in the following 
section. 
 
Table 2. Performance indicators of the non-structural functionality of a building unit. 
 
For example, the comfort of the residents of a building unit decreases after a catastrophic event, if 
utilities such as water, electricity, natural gas, communication, and heating are missing. The 
performance of a hospital reduces if the facility is isolated or partly connected to the transportation 
network, because it cannot be reached from injuries and casualties. A building unit that is not 
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accessible cannot accommodate persons or be repaired. Hence, the non-structural functionality is 
analytically defined as 
 qNS ,u
Ph,B,h,t t( ) =
wP
Ph,B,h,t ×qP,u
Ph,B,h,t t( ) + wjPh,B,h,t ×qj ,u t( )
j

wP
Ph,B,h,t + wj
Ph,B,h,t
j
  (7) 
where j is the performance index (A, W, E, N, OL, C, H, and O) and wjPh,B,h,t are the weight 
coefficients associated to each performance and are function of the type of building unit. For 
example, a housing unit does not offer a public service to the community, but it has a residential 
purpose that can be achieved when it is accessible, while its comfort depends on the quality of the 
utilities received (wAPh,B,R,HU=50; wWPh,B,R,HU=10; wEPh,B,R,HU=16; wNPh,B,R,HU=8; wOLPh,B,R,HU=0; 
wCPh,B,R,HU=10; wHPh,B,R,HU=6; wOPh,B,R,HU=0; and wPPh,B,R,HU=0). 
5.2.1 Loss and recovery functions 
A performance indicator for a building unit during the transient analysis is function of time t and 
other parameters that depend on the type of building unit. In literature, several models describe the 
performance functions, which can be either empirical or analytical depending on the source of data 
and the type of analysis [Cimellaro et al., 2010b]. Empirical performance functions are based on 
test or real-time interpretation of field data and engineering judgment. Since the complexity of the 
problem changes case by case, no specific models are presented in this section. Analytical 
performance functions are developed from the community response data obtained through the 
analysis of the system using numerical simulations. The essential requirement of the analytical 
models is the simplicity, therefore the model should be selected so that it is easy to fit to real or 
numerical observation data and the number of parameters involved should be as low as possible. In 
general, in the performance function it is possible to distinguish three phases (see Figure 2): 
 Loss, i.e. when the functionality drops, 
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 Administrative, which is defined as the time elapsed from the disaster time until the 
beginning of recovery, and 
 Recovery, i.e. when the building is being repaired. 
 
Figure 2. Typical Performance Function. 
Therefore, a general formulation to evaluate the performances of an indicator qj,u(t) which is given 
by the following equation is proposed 
 
qj,u t( ) = qj,ube + dqj,uk t( ) ×H t TDj,uk( ) × rj,uI ,k t,TDj,uk ,TLj,uk( ) + ...{
k

qj,u
re  qj,ube
dqj,u
k t( ) ×H t TDj,uk( ) 
k

+ rj,uI ,k t,TDj,uk ,TLj,uk( )
æ
è
ç
ç
ç
ö
ø
÷
÷
÷
×rj,uII ,k t,TAj,uk ,TRj,uk( )


ú
ú
ú
ü
ý

þ

 (8) 
where qj,ube is the functionality before the disaster; qj,ure is the functionality after the recovery phase; 
k is the damage index (i.e., indicates the earthquakes sequence); TDj,uk are the times of occurrence 
of damages, i.e. the time when a kth loss has occurred; H(t-TDj,uk) is the Heaviside step function, 
dqj,uk(t) are the losses of functionality due to a certain damage k (these are given by Equation (12)), 
TLj,uk are the time of losses, i.e. the time when a kth loss has completed the drop, TAj,uk are the 
administrative times, i.e. time when start a kth recovery process, rj,uI,k(t,TDj,uk,TLj,uk) is the loss 
function, rj,uII,k(t,TAj,uk,TRj,uk) is the recovery function, and TRj,uk are the recovery times, i.e. time 
when finish a kth recovery process that is given by: 
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 TRj ,u
k = TAj ,u
k + dTRj ,u
k t( ) (9) 
where dTRj,uk are the repair and clean-up, or construction times of the physical infrastructure unit 
(these are evaluated using HAZUS for building units and ATC-13 for bridges). The loss and 
recovery functions are analytically defined as follows 
 rj,u
a ,k t,TS,TF( ) =
0 t £ TS
gj,u
a ,k t, x1,.., xn( ) TS  t  TF
1 TF  t






with a = I,  II  (10) 
where gj,uak(t,x1,…,xn) has been defined as bound function, which can be any function that respects 
the condition given by 
 
 
gj ,u
a ,k t, x1,..., xn( ) C 0
gj ,u
a ,k TS , x1,..., xn( ) = 0   gj ,ua ,k TF , x1,..., xn( ) = 1
0 £ gj ,u
a ,k t, x1,..., xn( ) £1   "t 






 (11) 
where x1,…,xn are the parameters involved in describing the bound function. The functionality in 
Equation (8) can be used for modelling both short-term and long-term recoveries. Long-term 
recovery model is used when the reconstruction phase needs to be modelled, while short-term 
recovery model is used when the emergency phase after the extreme event needs to be focused 
upon. The latter is performed by the overlapping of the loss phase and the recovery phase (see 
Figure 3), i.e. imposing TAj,uk≤ TLj,uk. 
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Figure 3. Overlapping between loss and recovery phases. 
5.3 Losses Estimation 
This section presents the methodology to estimate the losses, the height of debris that felt from 
buildings on the roads during an earthquake and the accessibility of the building units.  
5.3.1 Structural Performance Function of a Building Unit 
In the proposed methodology the damage states (0=none, 1=slight, 2=moderate, 3=extensive, and 
4=complete) of building and of road network units are defined and evaluated according to the 
HAZUS methodology [FEMA, 2003]. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a strong correlation 
between losses and probabilities of damage states (structural and non-structural). Its definition is 
based on the identification of the physical damages of the structural (e.g., beams, columns, walls, 
etc.) and non-structural (e.g., partition walls, ceilings, etc.) elements. Since the damage states, so 
identified, do not take into account the usability of the infrastructure, it is proposed a method to 
convert the damage states into functionality losses, i.e. usability losses. The usability of an 
infrastructure unit is correlated to the damage states and to its typology. For example, if a building 
unit is evacuated when a certain damage state is reached, a critical facility such as a hospital, that 
should remain functional during an emergency, might not close under the same damage state level.  
Hence, the structural functionality losses of a physical infrastructure unit dqS,uk due to the kth event 
are given by 
 dqS,u
k = qS,u
k TDS,u
k( ) ×
wS,ds,u
Ph,B,h,t ×PDSS,ds,u
Ph,B,h,t
ds=1
dsmax

wS,ds,u
x
ds=1
dsmax

 (12) 
where ds is the damage state index, k is an index that identifies kth earthquake into the sequence of 
earthquakes, PDSj,ds,i,pPh,B,h,t are probabilities of being in, or exceeding, a given structural damage 
state (function of structural features and of seismic demand), qS,uk(TDj,uk) is the structural 
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functionality evaluated at TDj,uk (i.e., before the kth loss occurs), wS,ds,uPh,B,h,t are the weight 
coefficients that convert the probabilities of damage states in % of structural functionality (e.g., for 
a hospital it can be assumed wS,1,uPh,B,H,H=5, wS,2,uPh,B,H,H=10, wS,3,uPh,B,H,H=25, and wS,4,uPh,B,H,H=60, 
while for a housing unit wS,1,uPh,B,R,HU=5, wS,2,uPh,B,R,HU=45, wS,3,uPh,B,R,HU=40, and wS,4,uPh,B,R,HU=10). 
In particular, the loss function rS,uI,k(t,TDS,uk,TLS,uk) is assumed with a linear bound function and has 
TDS,uk=TLS,uk, while the recovery function rS,uII,k(t,TAS,uk,TRS,uk) is assumed with a cumulative 
lognormal bound function and as default KS,uk=3 (see Figure 4). Moreover, the structural 
functionality values before the disaster and after the recovery phase have been assumed 
qS,ube=qS,ure=1. 
 
Figure 4. Structural functionality for building and road units. 
5.3.2 Debris height generated by building collapse on a road network 
The interdependencies in term of damage assessment between road network and a generic building 
unit are shown in Figure 5. In fact, a building unit, after damage, releases a certain amount of debris 
that can affect the normal traffic flow of the road network. 
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Figure 5. Interdependences in the damage assessment between road network edge and building 
units. 
The amount of debris, which falls from a building unit, has been estimated according to the HAZUS 
empirical approach. Its output is the weight (tons) of two types of debris: large (such as steel 
members or reinforced concrete elements) and small (e.g., brick, wood, glass, building contents and 
other materials) pieces [FEMA, 2003]. Since the unit weight for both types of debris is equal to 1.3 
ton/m3, we have converted the two weights into a total volume (m3) of debris DuPh,B,h,t. The fall of 
debris generated from a single building unit is localized and depends on the building features and on 
the seismic demand. The closure of a road or a bridge occurs when all lanes are unusable. Hence, 
the average height of debris on the nth lane HDn,j is evaluated summing the effects of the building 
units (BIAe,u) that stay inside the influence area of the road. The effects are estimated according to 
the projectile motion, assuming a triangular distribution of the velocity (v0×y/Hi; see Figure 6) and a 
maximum velocity v0 at the top of the building unit equal to Sa,i×Ti/2. Hence, HDn,j analytically is 
given by 
 
HDn, j
k =
f x, y,dz × j + dz
2
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
xL ,n  xL,n1
×dy ×dx
0
yBi z( )
ò
xL ,n1
xL ,n
ò
iBIAe ,u

with: f x, y, z( ) =
Di
x,k
VBi
   xBi ,1 z( ) £ x + sgn xBi ,1 z( )( ) ×Ti ×Sa,i2 ×Hi × 2 ×
y3
g
£ xBi ,2 z( )
0              otherwise





 (13) 
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where x, y, and z are the coordinates that are graphically defined in Figure 6, j is the index of the 
strips with constant depth dz, n is the lane index, i is the building unit index, BIAe,u is the set of 
buildings that stay inside the influence area of the edge unit, xL,n are the limits that define the shape 
of the lanes, yBi(z), xBi,2(z) and xBi,1(z) are the limits that define the shape of the ith building unit at jth 
strip, dz is the depth of the strips, dzj+dz/2 is the mean value in terms of curvilinear abscissa of the 
jth strip, f(x,y,z) evaluates the volume of debris that falls on the lane, VBi is the volume of the ith 
building unit, Ti and Sa,i are the spectral period and acceleration of the ith building unit evaluated in 
the section, Hi is the height of the building (note that Hi≥yBi(z)), and g is the acceleration of gravity. 
 
Figure 6. Geometrical definition of the debris motion. 
5.3.3 Accessibility Performance Function of a Building Unit 
This section focuses on the accessibility performance function qA,u(t) of the building units. The loss 
function rA,uI,k(t,TDA,uk,TLA,uk) is assumed with a linear bound function and has TDA,uk=TLA,uk=TAA,uk, 
while the recovery function rA,uII,k(t,TAA,uk,TRA,uk) is assumed with a multi-step bound function 
(Figure 7). The accessibility losses and the accessibility values before the disaster and after the 
recovery phase are assumed qA,ube=qA,ure= dqA,uk, =1. Therefore, the accessibility performance 
function is analytically defined as follows 
 qA,u t( ) = 1 when it is accessible0 otherwise




 (14) 
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Figure 7. Accessibility performance function for building units. 
6 CASE STUDIES  
The methodology has been implemented in a software, which is able to assign the damage states of 
the buildings and of the road network. It also evaluates a recovery plan that maximizes the 
resilience index with respect to physical, social, and economic constraints. The proposed model has 
been tested – to evaluate the interdependencies between the road network and the building system – 
using two case studies: 
 The old medieval centre of L’Aquila town during the 2009 earthquake, and 
 Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay area. 
6.1 The Old Medieval Centre of L’Aquila Town during the 2009 earthquake 
On April 6th 2009, the Italian region Abruzzo was affected by an earthquake with a local magnitude 
of 5.9 on the Richter scale (6.3 on the moment magnitude scale). The epicentre of the main shock 
was near the urban centre of L’Aquila (less than 10 km). The seismic action measured with the 
Housner Intensity parameter [Housner, 1952] was generally higher than that measured with a return 
period TR of 475 years, but remarkably lowers than that with TR of 2,475 years [Masi et al., 2011]. It 
is assumed that inside the selected region there are twenty-two building units near Piazza del 
Duomo with different features (that are not real, but are modelled with realistic features for the case 
study; see Table 4a). Moreover, the graph of the transportation network of L’Aquila (with the 
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district assumption) was downloaded from the Open Street Map database [OSM , 2013]. The total 
length of the network is about 2,000 km. In Figure 8 are shown the B units selected in the old 
medieval centre (in purple) and the road network of L’Aquila (the traffic sources are the green 
markers, the standard roads are the blue edges, and the district roads are the red edges). 
 
Figure 8. Road Network (a) and Building Units (b) near Piazza del Duomo, L’Aquila. 
 
The seismic risk assessment has been performed with a pseudo-probabilistic hazard analysis 
assuming the collapse of all bridges, the debris on the roads caused by building damage; and a 
return period (TR) of 1,000 years [Calvi, 2010]. The test evaluates four scenarios (i.e., Case 1, Case 
2, Case 3, and Case 4) corresponding to four different boundary constraints. The recovery process 
for the road network is evaluated assuming that there are unlimited resources (construction workers) 
therefore the reconstruction phase of an edge starts when its site is accessible from the traffic source 
nodes. A source is a node, which has only outgoing flow and it is located at the intersection of the 
road network with the border of the region analysed. While, the recovery process for the building 
units is evaluated according to the boundary constraints described in Table 3. Moreover, the 
interdependencies between the road network and the building system have been considered 
assuming that a non-accessible building unit cannot be recovered. 
Table 3. Boundary constrains for the four cases. 
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The weight coefficients associated to each system of Physical Infrastructure dimension, building 
units, and non-structural features are assumed as follows 
 
ws
Ph = 1 s = T, B
0 "s ÏT, B




    wS, j,u
Ph,B,h,t =
1 j = 0
5 j =1
10 j = 2
24 j = 3
60 j = 4
  






WNS,u
Ph,B,h,t =1                       wjPh,B,h,t =
1 j = A
0 others




 (15) 
Table 4. Features of the building units in: (a) old medieval centre of L’Aquila and (b) Treasure 
Island in San Francisco Bay. 
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a)   b)  
6.1.1 Seismic Risk Assessment 
Figure 9 shows the discrete probabilities of the damage states for building units and the road 
network that are plotted on a 3-D histogram located on top of the Google Earth maps of the case 
study analysed. The red edges in the road means they are not accessible, while the purple edges are 
accessible. The debris released from the damaged building units are about 58 m3 and do not 
influence the functionality of the road network, because the height of released debris per unit length 
on the edges involved (in this case two district roads) is less than 0.01 m. The road network, 
although it is damaged, it can still ensure the accessibility to the building units from the traffic 
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sources immediately after the disaster. Hence, the administrative times of the accessibility functions 
for all buildings units are equal to the disaster time TDis. 
 
Figure 9. Damage states for Road Network (a) and Building system (b). 
Table 4a shows the distribution of the damage states in all the buildings in the selected region.  The 
building units that have the higher damages are buildings 1 and 2. This result is easy to predict 
because the two buildings are normal buildings designed with low seismic design level (low code). 
Instead, buildings 3 and 9 suffer minor damage because they are residential buildings designed with 
high seismic design level (high code). In summary, the analyses show that the road network, 
although damaged it is still able to remain functional.  
6.1.2 Resilience Assessment 
As was shown in Table 3, the first and fourth cases have, respectively, the minimum (CS=CSS=0) 
and maximum (CS=CSS=22) availability construction building sites per day and simultaneous start 
of construction sites. The second case has the maximum limit of one CS and of one CSS in 7 days; 
while, the third case has the limit of three CS and of three CSS in 7 days. In all cases, there are no-
limits on economic budget. In Table 5 are shown the administrative times, resilience indices at one 
and at two years of building units used for the 4 cases. 
 
Table 5. Recovery Parameters of Old medieval Centre of L’Aquila. 
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In Figure 10 are shown the Physical Infrastructure resilience indices, the time of completion of the 
works TEW, and the Physical Infrastructure functionality values at TEW for each case. The resilience 
index is an unbiased parameter to evaluate the performance of the recovery plan, because it is 
independent of the user selection of the control period. The results show that Case 4 is the most 
resilient, while Case 1 has the smallest value of resilience. Case 2 has maximum (than the other 
cases) finite value of recovery time TEW that is equal to 4.23 years; while Case 4 has the smallest 
(0.37 years). The functionality of Case 1 is equal to 83% because this case has no recovery works. 
 
Figure 10. Resilience indices and end-work times. 
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The Physical Infrastructure functionality and resilience after one and two years are shown in Figure 
11. The resilience value decreases with the decreasing of the velocity of recovery, so it is a good 
parameter to evaluate the performance of the Physical Infrastructure dimension and of the chosen 
recovery plan. 
 
Figure 11. Functionality and resilience: at one year (a), and at two years (b). 
The different results are due to the differences in the buildings sites availability (workers / day) 
between various cases. Case 4 requests immediately a higher number of workers per day, while 
Cases 1, 2, and 3 (this is the most realistic and efficient) have a stable distribution in time. The 
functionality curves of the Physical Infrastructure Dimension, of the Building System, and of the 
Transportation System are shown in Figure 12. The recovery time of the transportation system for 
Cases 2, 3, and 4 is equal to 0.25 years. 
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Figure 12. Recovery functions for each case of: Building system (a), Transportation system (b), and 
Physical Infrastructure dimension (c). 
In conclusion, Cases 2, 3, and 4 have similar resilience indices. Case 4 has the smallest TEW, but 
requests a higher number of men per day. Therefore, the most effective recovery plan is that of 
Case 3, which ensures a fast recovery with a small number of resources. 
6.2 Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay area 
The San Francisco Bay Area sits within the Pacific-North America plate boundary, which takes the 
form of multiple fault strands through the region. It has the highest density of active faults and the 
highest seismic moment rate per square kilometre of any urban area in the United States [WG02, 
2003]. In 1906, the San Francisco Bay Area was reaching the end of a period of major seismic 
build-up and large earthquakes, which culminated in the great 1906 earthquake, in which 
approximately 3,000 persons were killed and 28,000 buildings were destroyed. Because of the stress 
relief due to the 1906 earthquake, the San Francisco Bay Area has been relatively quiet seismically, 
but a more recent study [WG02, 2003] estimated that there is a 62% probability of occurrence of an 
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earthquake with M≥6.7 from 2002 to 2032 (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Map of the San Francisco Bay Area showing the urban areas and the probabilities of 
M≥6.7 earthquakes by 2032. 
Therefore, Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay has been selected to observe the interdependencies 
between the road network and the building system, and the key role of the accessibility during the 
reconstruction and after a catastrophic earthquake. We have modelled twenty-one building units on 
the Island with realistic features (e.g. capacity curves, damping ratios, occupancy classes, repair 
costs etc.; see Table 4b). The graph of the transportation network of the Treasure Island (with the 
district assumption) was downloaded from the Open Street Map database [OSM , 2013]. The total 
length of the network is about of 3,000 km. In particular, the Treasure Island is connected to San 
Francisco and Oakland through the Bay Bridge, which is located on Highway 80. The selected 
building units (in purple) in Treasure Island and the road network (as above: the traffic sources are 
the markers in green, the standard roads are the edges in blue, and the district roads are the red 
edges) of the island are shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. a) Building Units and b) Road Network in Treasure Island, San Francisco. 
The interdependencies between the road network and the building system were modelled 
considering the accessibility – i.e. if a building unit is not accessible from the road network it will 
not be repaired and used, losing its functionality – and the mutual damage – i.e., if a building unit 
collapses in the influence area of a road, this will lose its functionality. Four different scenarios 
have been considered. The risk assessment has been evaluated with a pseudo-probabilistic hazard 
analysis assuming that all the bridges have collapsed and the seismic action has a return period of 
2,450 years (i.e., it means to analyse the Ultimate Limit State). The recovery process for building 
units is evaluated according to the boundary constraints described in Table 3; while, for the road 
network is evaluated assuming unlimited resources of workers. The weight coefficients associated 
to each system (Physical Infrastructure dimension, building units, and non-structural features) are 
assumed as before (Equation (15)). 
6.2.1 Risk Assessment 
The discrete probabilities of damage states for building units and the functionality of the road 
network at the disaster time TDis are plotted in Figure 15 on a 3D histogram located on top of the 
map of the studied region in Google Earth. The volume of debris released from the damaged 
building units is of 404 m3 and does not affect significantly the functionality of the road network; 
while, the collapse of the bridges makes the Treasure Island unreachable from the mainland. 
Therefore, the physical infrastructures on the island are not accessible, because of the collapse of 
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the bridges that connect Treasure Island to the mainland. Hence, the building units and the district 
edges inside the Island are unusable, i.e. they have zero functionality. 
 
Figure 15. Discrete probability of damage states for building units (a) and functionality of the road 
network (b). 
The detailed results of the building units inside the island are shown in Table 4b. The building units 
that have the lower damages are buildings 3 and 15. This result was easy to predict because the two 
buildings are special buildings designed with moderate seismic design level (moderate code). The 
most damaged building units are buildings 9, 10, and 11 that are normal buildings designed with 
low seismic design level (low code). 
In conclusion, the bridges that connect the Island to the mainland are critical infrastructures, 
because with their simultaneous collapse there is no way to ensure the accessibility of the Treasure 
Island from the traffic sources immediately after the disaster. 
6.2.2 Resilience Assessment 
The restoration strategies described in this case study have the same assumptions of the previous 
examples. In Table 6 are shown the administrative times, the resilience indices respectively after 1 
and 2 years of the building units used for the 4 cases. 
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Table 6. Recovery Parameters of Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay. 
 
In Figure 16 are shown the Physical Infrastructure resilience indices, the time of completion of the 
works TEW, and the Physical Infrastructure functionality values at TEW for each case. The results 
show that Case 2, 3, and 4 have the same resilience, while Case 1 has the smallest value of 
resilience. Case 2 has the highest value of recovery time TEW that is equal to 7.66 years; while Case 
4 has the smallest (0.70 years). The functionality of Case 1 is equal to 21% and its recovery time is 
infinite, because this case has no recovery works. 
31 
 
 
Figure 16. Resilience indices and end-work times. 
The Physical Infrastructure functionality and resilience indices after one and two years are shown in 
Figure 17. The different results are due to the differences in the buildings sites availability (men / 
day) between various cases. In particular, Case 4 is the only one that reached the complete 
functionality after two years. 
 
Figure 17. Functionality and resilience: at one year (a), and at two years (b). 
Similarly, Case 4 requests immediately a higher number of men per day, while Cases 1, 2, and 3 
(this is the most realistic and efficient) have a more homogeneous distribution in time. The 
functionality curves of the Physical Infrastructure Dimension, of the Building System, and of the 
Transportation System are shown in Figure 18. The recovery time of transportation system for 
Cases 2, 3, and 4 is equal to 0.29 years, while, for Case 1 is infinite. 
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Figure 18. Recovery functions for each case of: Building system (a), Transportation system (b), 
and  
Physical Infrastructure dimension (c). 
On 42nd day – when the first bridge that links the island to the mainland has been recovered – the 
functionality curves have a leap, because district roads and building units inside Treasure Island are 
again reachable and can be reused and/or repaired (Figure 19). Hence, the administrative times of 
the accessibility functions for all buildings units are equal to 42 days. 
 
Figure 19. Functionality after the disaster time (a) and at 42th day (b). 
In conclusion, as before, the most powerful recovery plan is that of Case 3, which ensures a fast 
recovery with a small number of resources. The simultaneous collapse of the bridges, which 
connect the island to the mainland, produced a delay of 42 days in the recovery plan. This caused a 
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reduction of the performances of the physical infrastructures (i.e., resilience index) and an increase 
of the recovery times, emphasizing the importance of the accessibility of the physical infrastructures 
after a catastrophic event. 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Several areas of the world are located on critical seismic zones requiring special consideration for 
rescue management plans.  Experience has shown that earthquake damage to the roadway network 
goes way beyond direct and indirect costs. The real problem are created by the extent of damage 
caused by lack of mobility and accessibility to devastated areas which affect post-earthquake 
emergency response causing further loss of life and disruption of traffic within the urban network.  
In fact, after an earthquake, part or most of the roadway network might be close, because of the 
collapse of structural elements (i.e. tunnels, bridges, etc.) and/or because of the debris from 
housing/building damage.  Therefore, this paper presents a new method to measure disaster 
resilience that takes into account the interdependencies between the road networks and the building 
units following an earthquake event.  A performance function and an analytical model are proposed 
to assess respectively, the performances of the physical infrastructure units and to evaluate the 
amount of debris, which falls from a building unit on the road. Results are compared in term of 
Community Resilience Indices RI and recovery time TEW which are the parameters used to evaluate 
the performances of the infrastructures after a natural disaster.  
The methodology has been implemented in a computer platform which allows an easy environment 
to input data and to display output directly on regional maps, letting the users see the geospatial 
distribution for a given hazard scenario. In addition, it has been applied to two case studies: (1) the 
old medieval centre of L’Aquila in Italy and (2) Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay, in California. 
The first case study shows how the buildings and the transportation system are modelled and 
discusses the community performances parameters, i.e. the resilience index RI and the recovery 
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time TEW. The second case study shows the importance of network redundancy and of the 
interdependencies between the physical infrastructures and the recovery services.   
In conclusion, the proposed methodology can be used to develop different scenarios of road closure 
for different earthquake levels for example. This will allow identifying the emergency routes based 
on network characteristics and setting that is an essential part of developing access to devastated 
areas and emergency relief locations like hospitals, medical centers, shelters, warehouses, and fire 
stations. As outcome, an evacuation plan from the affected region can be developed.   
In summary, different scenarios of urban planning can be tested with the proposed methodology and 
compared in term of resilience indicators by decision makers and transportation service providers.  
The method can be used to identify which area should receive funding priority in order to improve 
the performance of the transportation system during the emergency response.   
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